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Theories ⋆
Yannick Chevalier ∗,1 Michael Rusinowitch ∗∗
Abstract
Recently automated deduction tools have proved to be very effective for detecting
attacks on cryptographic protocols. These analysis can be improved, for finding more
subtle weaknesses, by a more accurate modelling of operators employed by protocols.
Several works have shown how to handle a single algebraic operator (associated
with a fixed intruder theory) or how to combine several operators satisfying disjoint
theories. However several interesting equational theories, such as exponentiation
with an abelian group law for exponents remain out of the scope of these techniques.
This has motivated us to introduce a new notion of hierarchical combination for non
disjoint intruder theories and to show decidability results for the deduction problem
in these theories. We have also shown that under natural hypotheses hierarchical
intruder constraints can be decided. This result applies to an exponentiation theory
that appears to be more general than the one considered before.
Key words: Cryptographic protocols, Dolev-Yao intruder, combination of decision
procedures, equational theories
1 Introduction
Recently many procedures have been proposed to determine whether cryp-
tographic protocols are insecure in the Dolev-Yao model with respect to a
finite number of protocol sessions [5,2,32,26,23,4,17]. Among the different ap-
proaches the symbolic ones [5,2,32,26,12,4,17] are based on reducing the prob-
lem to constraint solving in a term algebra. While these approaches rely on
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a perfect encryption hypothesis, the design of some protocols (see e.g. [35])
rely on lower-level primitives such as exponentiation or bitwise exclusive or
(xor). These specifications may give rise to new attacks exploiting the under-
lying algebraic structure when it is not abstracted as perfect encryption. For
examples of attacks exploiting e.g. the bitwise xor equational properties in the
context of mobile communications see for instance [6].
Hence several protocol decision procedures have been designed for handling
equational properties [30,15,8,24] of the cryptographic primitives. A very fruit-
ful concept in this area is the notion of locality introduced by McAllester [25]
which applies to several intruder theories [16,24]. When an intruder theory is
local then we can restrict every intruder deduction to contain only subterms
of its inputs, i.e. its hypotheses and its goal and this may lead to decidability
of intruder constraints. In this article we extend this approach to a case where
the signature can be divided into two disjoint sets and where the term algebra
can be divided into two kinds of terms, say kinds 0 and 1, according to their
root symbol. Then we give sufficient conditions so that we can restrict intruder
deductions to deductions where all subterms of kind 1 that occur in the de-
duction are subterms of the inputs (i.e. some initially given terms and the goal
term). Our goal is to bound the deductions using a “function” of kind 1 by the
intruder, thus permitting subsequent analysis to focus on the deductions by
“function” of kind 0.
This approach allows us to decide interesting intruder theories presented as
non-disjoint combination of theories, and that were not considered before, by
reducing them to simpler theories. For instance it allows one to combine the
Abelian group theory of [27] with a theory of an exponential operator.
Related works. In [10] we have extended the combination algorithm for
solving E-unification problems of [34,3] to solve intruder constraints on disjoint
signatures. Here we show that we can handle some non-disjoint combinations.
In [18] Delaune and Jacquemard consider theories presented by rewrite systems
where the right-hand side of every rule is a ground term or a variable. Comon
and Treinen [16,14] have also investigated general conditions on theories for
deciding insecurity with passive intruders. In [1] different equational theories
are considered for passive intruders only.
As an application, we have obtained a decidable intruder theory combining
Abelian group and exponential which has less restrictions than any previous
one: unlike [9] it permits the intruder to multiply terms outside exponents,
which is natural with the Diffie-Hellman protocol where the prime decompo-
sition of the module is public. The setting is also less restrictive than in [33]
where bases of exponentials have to be constants and exponential terms must
not appear inside exponents.
Outline. In Section 2 we present the topic of analysis of cryptographic pro-
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tocol insecurity. In Section 3 we will first recall basic notions about terms,
substitutions and term rewriting. In Section 4 we recall the definition of in-
truder systems from [10], we recall a model for cryptographic protocols and
we define related constraint systems. In Section 5 we define a new notion of
mode. We then derive a notion of subterm value from the mode, and study
properties of term replacement operations. In Section 6 we define the notion
of well-moded intruders. We also prove the existence of special sequences of
deductions called quasi well-formed derivations. In Section 7 we define for a
constraint system C a special kind of substitutions called bound substitutions.
We prove that whenever a constraint system C is satisfiable it is also satisfied
by a bound substitution. We also prove that these solutions do not increase
the number of subterms of C, i.e. after instantiating C with a bound solu-
tion, the number of subterms in the result is lesser or equal. We then give
in Section 8 sufficient conditions for the decidability of some protocol-related
decision problems. We then apply these conditions to prove the decidability
of the protocol insecurity problem when an exponential operator is present.
2 Analysis of cryptographic protocols
2.1 An example
The Station-to-Station (STS) protocol (see e.g. [31]) is a cryptographic key
agreement scheme that relies on Diffie-Hellman key construction method. It
improves over Diffie-Hellman protocol by adding signatures to messages to
block some simple man-in-the middle attacks. Hence STS protocol is classified
as an authenticated key agreement with key confirmation protocol. Here is a
simplified version of STS: Initially g is a generator of a cyclic group p, and these
parameters are public; A(lice) generates a random number a and computes and
sends the exponential exp(g, a) to B(ob); Bob generates a random number b
and computes the exponential exp(g, b); Bob concatenates the exponentials,
signs them using his private key K−1B , appends it to exp(g, b) and sends the
resulting message to Alice. Alice verifies Bob’s signature, concatenates the
exponentials in reverse order, signs them using her private key K−1A , and sends
the result to Bob.
1. A→ B : exp(g, a), A
2. B → A : exp(g, b), {exp(g, b), exp(g, a)}K−1
B
3. A→ B : {exp(g, a), exp(g, b)}K−1
A
The ability for Alice and Bob to build a secret shared key exp(g, a× b) relies
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on the algebraic properties of exp and ×: for instance it exploits the property
exp(exp(g, a), b) = exp(exp(g, b), a) = exp(g, a× b). Moreover it also relies on
the properties of asymmetric cryptography that can modelled at an abstract
level by laws of type: {{m}K−1
A
}KA = m expressing that when applying KA
(to be more precise, an algorithm depending from KA) to the signed message
{m}K−1
A
one can retrieve m.
This example shows that the design and the analysis of cryptographic protocols
is often based on algebraic properties of the functions involved in the messages.
Moreover it is frequent that a property is expressed by combining several
operators, as it is the case above where some useful properties involve both
exp and ×.
2.2 Analysis in presence of algebraic properties
As we see the algebraic properties of primitives are important for many proto-
cols to work properly. As a consequence they have to be handled appropriately
when analysing the security of protocols.There exist two main settings for per-
forming protocol analysis: the computational one and the Dolev-Yao one. In
the computational setting one tries to reduce the security of protocols to the
security of primitives (e.g. encryption), which is itself characterized by the fact
that no adversary can efficiently recover any information about the encrypted
message content, given the ciphertext and (in the case of a public key system)
the encryption key. This approach when successful provides strong security
guarantees. However it leads to complex proofs and is not easily amenable to
automation. On the other hand the Dolev-Yao approach, sometimes called the
symbolic approach, rather considers encryption and other functions as abstract
datatypes and allows for more automation of security proofs.
Note that it is not worth attempting a computational security proof of a
protocol if some flaws are already found in the Dolev-Yao model. Hence the
two approaches can be viewed as complementary: to secure a protocol one may
first check for flaws in the symbolic setting (possibly with automatic tools) and
then, once they are corrected, try computational proofs.
However in order to get a more faithful analysis in the symbolic setting one has
to model as much as possible the algebraic properties of the functions. A par-
ticularly important primitive is the modular exponentiation function, whose
properties are seldom handled by verification tools. As mentionned above a
challenge is also to consider the properties of several functions together. In
important instance of this problem is the case of an exponentiation and an
abelian group operator.
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To model them we can use the following equational theory Eexp,×:
x× (y × z) = (x× y)× z (A)
x× y = y × x (C)
x× 1 = x (U)
x× i(x) = 1 (I)
exp(x, 1) = x (E0)
exp(exp(x, y), z) = exp(x, y × z) (E1)
In our approach to be detailed in the following the intruder abilities will be
specified by a set of terms, such as T = {x× y, i(x), 1, exp(x, y)}, representing
the messages he can derive. For instance given x, y the intruder is able to
construct x× y. The difficulty when checking whether an intruder can derive
a given message (e.g. in order to mount an attack) comes from the fact that
we have to reason modulo an equational theory, and for instance we have
to consider that exp(exp(g, a), b) and exp(exp(g, b), a) represents the same
message.
In [10] we have shown that it was possible to perform a modular protocol
analysis when the equational theory can be split in subtheories with disjoint
functional signatures Note however this approach does not allow in the ex-
ample above to separate the analysis on exp and × because of the equation
(E1).
Hence our first objective in this paper is to propose a method to reduce proto-
col analysis problems involving equational theories to simpler ones. The second
objective is to apply the method to decide insecurity in the symbolic approach
for protocols that use both exp and × with properties specified by E . In that
case the problem will be reduced to the decision of insecurity for protocols
where only × occurs.
3 Terms and rewriting
3.1 Basic notions
We consider an infinite set of free constants C and an infinite set of variables
X . For all signatures G (i.e. sets of function symbols not in C with arities), we
denote by T(G) (resp. T(G,X )) the set of terms over G ∪C (resp. G ∪C∪X ).
The former is called the set of ground terms over G, while the latter is simply
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called the set of terms over G. The arity of a function symbol f is denoted
by ar(f). Variables are denoted by x, y, terms are denoted by s, t, u, v, and
finite sets of terms are written E,F, ..., and decorations thereof, respectively.
We abbreviate E ∪F by E,F , the union E ∪{t} by E, t and E \ {t} by E \ t.
Given a signature G, a constant is either a free constant or a function symbol
of arity 0 in G. We define the set of atoms A to be the union of X and
the set of constants. Given a term t we denote by Var(t) the set of variables
occurring in t and by Cons(t) the set of constants occurring in t. We denote by
Atoms(t) the set Var(t) ∪ Cons(t). A substitution σ is an involutive mapping
from X to T(G,X ) such that Supp(σ) = {x|σ(x) 6= x}, the support of σ, is a
finite set. The application of a substitution σ to a term t (resp. a set of terms
E) is denoted tσ (resp. Eσ) and is equal to the term t (resp. E) where all
variables x have been replaced by the term σ(x). A substitution σ is ground
with respect to G if the image of Supp(σ) is included in T(G). A unification
problem is a pair of terms denoted by s
?
= t. A unification system is a finite
set of unification problems. A solution of a unification system is a substitution
σ, called a unifier, such that for all pairs s
?
= t in the system we have sσ = tσ.
An equational presentation H = (G, A) is defined by a set A of equations
u = v with u, v ∈ T(G,X ) and u, v without free constants. For any equational
presentation H the relation =H denotes the equational theory generated by
(G, A) on T(G,X ), that is the smallest congruence containing all instances
of axioms of A. Abusively we shall not distinguish between an equational
presentation H over a signature G and a set A of equations presenting it and
we denote both by H. We will also often refer to H as an equational theory
(meaning the equational theory presented by H).
The syntactic subterms of a term t are denoted Subsyn(t) and are defined
recursively as follows. If t is a variable or a constant then Subsyn(t) = {t}.
If t = f(t1, . . . , tn) then Subsyn(t) = {t} ∪
⋃n
i=1 Subsyn(ti). The positions in
a term t are sequences of integers defined recursively as follows, ǫ being the
empty sequence. The term t is at position ǫ in t. We also say that ǫ is the root
position. We write p ≤ q to denote that the position p is a prefix of position
q. If u is a syntactic subterm of t at position p and if u = f(u1, . . . , un) then
ui is at position p · i in t for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We write t|p the subterm of t at
position p. We denote by t[p ← s] the term obtained by replacing in t the
syntactic subterm at position p by s. If Π is a set of incomparable positions
(with respect to the ordering on positions) in term t we denote by t[Π ← v]
the term obtained by putting v at all positions of t that are in Π. We write
t[s] to denote a term t where s is a syntactic subterm of t.
In this paper, we will consider two disjoint signatures F0 and F1, an equational
theory E0 (resp. E1) on F0 (resp. F0 ∪ F1). We denote by F the union of the
signatures F0 and F1 and by E the union of the theories E0 and E1. We assume
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that E is consistent (i.e. two free constants are not equal modulo E). A term
t in T(F0,X ) (resp.T(F1,X )) is called a pure 0-term (resp. pure 1-term). We
denote by top(·) the function that associates to each term t its root symbol.
We also partition the set of variables X into two infinite sets X0 and X1.
3.2 Congruences and ordered rewriting
In this subsection we recall some properties of ordered rewriting [19] which
has been a useful notion (e.g. [3]) for proving the correctness of combination
of unification algorithms. Rewriting is the process of applying an oriented
equation l → r to reduce a term t, by replacing an instance of its left-hand
side lσ by a corresponding instance of its right-hand side rσ. Knuth-Bendix
completion method [19] attempts to transform a set of equations E into a
set of oriented equations (or rewrite rules) R such that rewriting becomes a
decision procedure for deciding the word problem in E. However the com-
pletion method may fail due to the impossibility of orienting an equation.
To avoid failure Knuth-Bendix completion procedure can be extended to deal
with unorientable equations obtaining the so-called unfailing completion pro-
cedure [22,19].
Let < be a simplification ordering on T(G) 2 assumed to be total on T(G) and
such that the minimum for < is a constant cmin ∈ C and non-free constants
are smaller than any non-constant ground term.
Ordered rewriting is an extension of rewriting to unorientable equations: it is
the process of applying an equation u = v (or v = u) to reduce a term t, by
replacing an instance of some side say uσ, by a corresponding instance of the
other side vσ under the condition that uσ > vσ.
Given a signature G, we denote by CspeG the set containing the constants in G
and cmin. For the signature F = F0 ∪ F1 defined earlier, we abbreviate CspeF
by Cspe. Given a possibly infinite set of equations O on the signature T(G) we
define the ordered rewriting relation→O by s→O s
′ iff there exists a position
p in s, an equation l = r in O and a substitution τ such that s = s[p ← lτ ],
s′ = s[p← rτ ], and rτ < lτ .
It has been shown (see [22,19]) that by applying the unfailing completion
procedure to a set of equations H we can derive a (possibly infinite) set of
equations O, called o-completion of H and such that, first, the congruence
relations =O and =H are equal on T(F); and second, the ordered rewrite
relation →O is convergent (i.e. terminating and confluent) on T(F). By the
2 by definition < satisfies for all s, t, u ∈ T(G) (i) s < t[s] if s and t[s] are different
terms and (ii) s < u implies t[s] < t[u]
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termination of →O every ground term t admits at least one normal form t
′
which is by definition a term that cannot be rewritten.
From now on when we say“the rewrite system→O” this will mean“the ordered
rewrite relation →O”, when will say “by convergence of O”, we will mean “by
convergence of→O on ground terms”. By convergence of O we can define (t)↓O
as the unique normal form of the ground term t for →O. If a term t is equal
to its normal form we say that t is normalised. Given a ground substitution σ
we denote by (σ)↓O the substitution with the same support such that for all
variables x ∈ Supp(σ) we have x(σ)↓O = (xσ)↓O. A substitution σ is normal if
σ = (σ)↓O. In the following we will denote by R an o-completion of E = E1∪E2.
4 Formal Security Analysis of Protocols
4.1 Intruder systems
We first recall here the general definition of intruder systems, as is given
in [10,11]. In the context of a security protocol (see e.g. [20,29] for a brief
overview), we model messages as ground terms and intruder deduction rules
as rewrite rules on sets of messages representing its knowledge. The intruder
derives new messages from a given (finite) set of messages by applying intruder
rules. Since we assume some equational axioms H are satisfied by the function
symbols in the signature, all these derivations have to be considered modulo
the equational congruence =H generated by these axioms. An intruder deduc-
tion rule in our setting is specified by a term t in some signature G. Given
values for the variables of t the intruder is able to generate the corresponding
instance of t. One may intuitively think of a term t modulo H as a function;
The variables of t are then its formal parameters.
Definition 1 An intruder system I is given by a triple 〈G,S,H〉 where G is a
signature, S ⊆ T(G,X ) and H is a set of equations between terms in T(G,X ).
To each t ∈ S we associate a deduction rule Lt : Var(t) → t and Lt,g denotes
the set of ground instances of the rule Lt modulo H:
Lt,g = {l → r | ∃σ, ground substitution on G, l = Var(t)σ and r =H tσ}
The set of rules LI is defined as the union of the sets L
t,g for all t ∈ S.
Each rule l → r in LI defines an intruder deduction relation →l→r between
finite sets of terms. Given two finite sets of terms E and F we define E →l→r F
if and only if l ⊆ E and F = E∪{r}. We denote→I the union of the relations
→l→r for all l→ r in LI and by →
∗
I the transitive closure of →I .
Example 1 Let →I× be the relation between ground sets of terms defined
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by the Abelian group intruder I× = 〈{×, i, 1}, {x× y, i(x), 1}, E×〉, where E×
contains axioms (A), (C), (U), (I) from Subsection 2.2. One has:
a, b, c× a→I× a, b, c× a, i(a)→I× a, b, c× a, i(a), c
The latter deduction resulting from the application of the rule x, y → x × y
with x instantiated by i(a), y instantiated by c×a, with right-hand side c which
is equal to i(a)× (c× a) modulo the equational theory.
Notice that by definition, given sets of terms E, E ′, F and F ′ such that
E =G E
′ and F =G F
′ we have E →I F iff E
′ →I F
′. We simply denote by
→ the relation →I when there is no ambiguity about I.
The next result will allow us to restrict our study to deductions with terms in
normal form.
Lemma 1 We assume that R is a rewrite system that is terminating and
confluent on ground terms such that =R and =H are the same relations. Then
given two sets of ground terms E and F , there is a deduction E → F iff there
is a deduction (E)↓ → (F )↓.
A derivation D of length n, n ≥ 0, is a sequence of steps of the form E0 →I
E0 ∪ {t1} = E1 →I · · · →I En with finite sets of ground terms E0, . . . En, and
ground terms t1, . . . , tn, such that Ei = Ei−1 ∪ {ti} for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. A
derivation is without stutter if for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, Ei =H Ej implies i = j.
The term tn is called the goal of the derivation. We define E
I
to be the set of
terms t such that there exists a derivation for intruder I starting from E of
goal t. If there is no ambiguity on the deduction system I we write E instead
of E
I
.
From Lemma 1 one can easily prove that it suffices to consider deductions
on sets of terms in normal form. In the sequel we will thus only consider
derivations on sets of terms in normal form with rules yielding terms in normal
form.
4.2 Protocol analysis
In this section we describe how protocols are modelled. The approach is stan-
dard [2,5,27]. Our semantics follows the one in [18]. We only consider a single
session of the protocol since it is well-known how to reduce several sessions to
this case.
In Dolev-Yao’s model the intruder can intercept, block and/or redirect all mes-
sages sent by honest agents. He is also able to send messages by masquerading
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his identity. Honest agents may know his identity, wrongly assume he is honest
and communicate with him on that basis. He has complete control over the
communication medium. We model this by considering that the intruder is
the network: messages sent by honest agents are sent directly to the intruder
and messages received by the honest agents are always sent by the intruder.
From the intruder’s point of view a finite execution of a protocol is therefore
the interleaving of a finite sequence of messages he has to send and a finite
sequence of messages he receives (and adds to his knowledge set).
We also assume the interaction of the intruder with one agent to be an atomic
step. The intruder sends a message m to a honest agent, this agent tests the
validity of this message and responds to it immediately. Alternatively an agent
may initiate an execution and in this case we assume it reacts to a dummy
message sent by the intruder.
A step is a triplet (recv(x); send(s);cond(e)) where x ∈ X , s ∈ T(G,X )
and e is a set of equations between terms of T(G,X ). The meaning of a step is
that upon receiving message x, the honest agent checks the equations in e and
sends the message s. An execution of a protocol is a finite sequence of steps.
Example 2 Consider the following simple protocol where two agents named
A(lice) and B(ob) communicate and where K is a symmetric key initially
known by A only.
A→ B : exp(M,B ×K)
B → A : B
A→ B : K
B → A : M
Alice sends some message M raised to the exponent B×K to Bob. Bob replies
by sending back his name B. In third message Alice reveals the key K to Bob.
Then Bob computes the inverses i(K) and i(B) of K and B respectively, in
the group of exponents. Next, he raises the first message he received to the
exponent i(K)× i(B). He derives M that he can send in the last message.
Hence by assuming the algebraic properties of the exponentiation operator exp,
and of the product and inverse ×, i(·) in the group of exponents, we can model
this protocol as:
recv(v1); send(exp(M,B ×K));cond({v1 = cmin})
recv(v2); send(B);cond(∅)
recv(v3); send(K);cond({v3 = B})
recv(v4); send(exp(v2, i(B)× i(v4)));cond({v2 = exp(y,B×
v4)})
recv(v5); send(cmin);cond(v5 =M)
Note that in this setting we can model that at some step i the message should
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match the pattern ti by adding an equation vi
?
= ti to S, as is done in last step
of the above example. An agent may also verify previously received messages
when he get new information (for example when B receives the third message).
Let I=〈G, S,H〉 be an intruder system. A configuration is a couple 〈P,N〉
where P is a finite sequence of steps and N is a set of ground terms (the knowl-
edge of the intruder). From the configuration 〈(recv(x); send(s);cond(e)) ·
P,N〉 a transition to (P ′, N ′) is possible iff there exists a ground substitution σ
such that xσ ∈ N
I
, σ |= e, N ′ = N∪{sσ} and P ′ = Pσ. A trace based-security
is a property that holds for a protocol if it holds for individual traces (runs of
the protocol and intruder). Secrecy and many authentication properties can
be reduced to the following Reachability problem:
Reachability
Input: an initial configuration 〈P,N0〉
Output:SAT iff there exists a reachable configuration 〈∅,M〉
Protocol insecurity. A major security problem is to decide whether the
intruder can deduce a secret m from a finite sequence of message exchanges
P . This problem can be reduced to reachability which in turn is reduced to
the resolution of some special constraint systems described below [18].
4.3 Constraint systems
We now introduce constraint systems that permit to model accurately the
above reachability problems. We first extend the definition of unification sys-
tems to equational theories:
Definition 2 (Unification systems modulo) Let H be a set of equational ax-
ioms on T(G,X ). An H-Unification system S is a finite set of pairs of terms
in T(G,X ) denoted by
{
ui
?
= vi
}
i∈{1,...,n}
. It is satisfied by a ground substitution
σ, and we note σ |= S, if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} uiσ =H viσ.
We say that a unification system is a word problem if it does not contain any
variable.
Definition 3 (Constraint systems) Let I = 〈G, S,H〉 be an intruder system.
An I-Constraint system C is denoted: ((Ei ✄ vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) and it is defined
by a sequence of couples (Ei, vi)i∈{1,...,n} with vi ∈ X and Ei ⊆ T(G,X ) for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and Ei−1 ⊆ Ei for i ∈ {2, . . . , n} and by an H-unification
system S.
A ground substitution σ satisfies a I-Constraint system C if for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n} we have viσ ∈ Eiσ and if σ |=H S. We denote it by σ |=I C.
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Constraint systems are denoted by C and decorations thereof. Note that if a
substitution σ is a solution of a constraint system C, by definition of constraint
and unification systems the substitution (σ)↓O is also a solution of C. In the
context of cryptographic protocols the inclusion Ei−1 ⊆ Ei means that the
knowledge of an intruder does not decrease as the protocol progresses.
Example 3 We model the protocol of Example 2 by the following constraint
system. First we gather all conditions in a unification system S
S =
{
v1
?
= cmin , v2
?
= exp(y,B × v4) , v3
?
= B , v5
?
=M
}
The protocol execution for intruder I with initial knowledge {cmin} is then
expressed by the constraint:
C = (( cmin ✄ v1,
cmin, exp(M,B ×K)✄ v2,
cmin, exp(M,B ×K), B ✄ v3,
cmin, exp(M,B ×K), B,K ✄ v4,
cmin, exp(M,B ×K), B,K, exp(v2, i(B)× i(v4))✄ v5),
S)
We are not interested in general constraint systems but only in those related
to protocols. In particular we need to express that a message to be sent by
a honest principal at some step i should be built from previously received
messages recorded in the variables vj, j < i, and from the initial knowledge.
To this end we define:
Definition 4 (Deterministic Constraint Systems) We say that an I cons-
traint system ((Ei✄vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) is deterministic if for all i in {1, . . . , n} we
have Var(Ei) ⊆ {v1, . . . , vi−1}
The decision problems we are interested in are the satisfiability and the ordered
satisfiability of intruder constraint systems.
I Satisfiability
Input: an I deterministic constraint system C
Output: Sat iff there exists a substitution σ such that: σ |=I C.
In order to be able to combine solutions of constraints for the intruder theory
I1 with solutions of constraint systems for intruders defined on a disjoint
signature we have, as for unification, to introduce some ordering constraints
to be satisfied by the solution. Intuitively, these ordering constraints prevent
from introducing a cycle when building a global solution (Ordering constraints
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can be arbitrary however we conjecture that some of them can be eliminated
by a sharper analysis of the problem). This motivates us to define the Ordered
Satisfiability problem:
I Ordered Satisfiability
Input: an I deterministic constraint system C, X the set of all vari-
ables and C the set of all free constants occurring in C and a
linear ordering ≺ on X ∪ C.
Output: Sat iff there exists a substitution σ such that σ |=I C and
for all x ∈ X and c ∈ C, x ≺ c implies c /∈ Sub(xσ)
We are also interesting in modelling the case of a passive intruder, i.e. an
ordered satisfiability problem in which a putative solution σ (a normal substi-
tution) is given along with the constraint system. These can be viewed, once
σ is applied, as special kind of constraint systems ((Ei ✄ vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) where
the Ei do not contain any variable, and the unification system S contains only
equations of type:
• vi
?
= ti, where ti a ground term;
• t
?
= t′, where t′ and t′ are ground terms (word equations).
Moreover, we assume that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} there exists exactly one equa-
tion vi
?
= ti in S. We say that constraint systems satisfying this requirements
are ground.
I Deduction problem
Input: a ground I constraint system C
Output: Sat iff all word equations are true and, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we
have ti ∈ Ei
5 Modes and replacements
5.1 Modes
We have seen above how to reduce protocol security problems to solving con-
straints on terms modulo equational theories. For this task we shall try to
apply a modular approach and exploit the fact that equational theories in this
context are often combination of simpler ones. When one considers the union
of two equational theories over two disjoint signatures, a standard strategy for
unification or constraint solving is to replace any subterm in the constraints, in
a bottom-up fashion, by a new variable when the root of this subterm is below
a symbol from another signature. In that way we can reduce the problem to
constraint solving in pure sub-signatures.
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sig : F ∪ X → {0, 1, 2}
sig(f) =


i if f ∈ Fi ∪ Xi for i ∈ {0, 1}
2 otherwise, i.e. when f is a free constant
Fig. 1. Definition of the sig(·) function.
This decomposition technique cannot be applied as such in the case of non-
disjoint signatures. We provide here a notion of mode that allows one (under
some hypotheses) to decompose a term in parts without losing any deduction:
the initial term can be rewritten by the equational theory iff one of its parts
can be rewritten.
This notion of mode is different from the standard notion of type. The latter
would impose that all considered terms must be well typed, while the former
is utilised on ill moded terms to split them into well moded parts.
For all f ∈ F ∪ X we define a function that gives the signature sig(f) to
which a symbol f belongs (see Figure 1). As usual we extend the function sig
to terms by setting, for a term t, sig(t) = sig(top(t)). In the following we
assume that there exists a mode function m(·, ·) such that m(f, i) is defined for
every symbol f ∈ F and every integer i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ ar(f). Moreover
we impose that for all f, i we have m(f, i) ∈ {0, 1} and m(f, i) ≤ sig(f).
A position p · i (where p is a position and i a strictly positive integer) in a
term t is well-moded with respect to m if and only if sig(t|p·i) = m(top(t|p), i).
We do not mention m when it is clear from context. If a position of t is not
well-moded we say it is ill-moded in t. The root position of a term t is always
ill-moded.
Let us now extend the well-moded notion:
• A term is well-moded if all its non root positions are well-moded;
• An equation s = t is well-moded if s and t are well-moded and sig(s) =
sig(t); An equational presentation H = (G, A) is well-moded if all equations
s = t in A are well-moded;
• A unification problem s
?
= t is well-moded if s and t are well-moded and
sig(s) = sig(t); A unification system
{
si
?
= ti
}
i∈J
is well-moded if si and ti
are well-moded and sig(si) = sig(ti) for all i ∈ J ;
• a substitution σ is well-moded if for any variable x we have sig(x) = sig(xσ)
and xσ is a well-moded term.
We now proceed to prove that if an equational theory is well-moded then its
completion is also well-moded. Since completion relies on syntactic unification,
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the first step is to prove that there is a most general unifier of two well-moded
terms that is well-moded.
Lemma 2 Let t1, t2 be two well-moded terms with sig(t1) = sig(t2). If they
are unifiable there exists a well-moded most general unifier σ of t1, t2 such that
t1σ is well-moded.
Proof. Assume t1 and t2 are unifiable with a most general unifier σ. We
consider a derivation of σ from equation {t1 = t2} using a rule-based unifi-
cation algorithm (see e.g. [19]). We show by induction on the length of the
derivation that for all equations u = v in an intermediate system IS, we have
sig(u)=sig(v) and u, v well-moded. This is initially true by assumption
If we apply a decomposition rule to a well-moded equation f(. . . , u, . . .) =
f(. . . , v, . . .) to get u = v, then u = v is well-moded and sig(u) = sig(v) =
m(f, i) for some i. If we apply a replacement of x = t in u = v, since sig(x) =
sig(t) and u = v is well moded by induction hypothesis, the operation replaces
occurrences of x by a well-moded term with a top symbol in the same signature.
The other cases are trivial. We finally notice that σ, considered as a set of
equations, is well-moded, and thus, when replacing variables by their value,
that t1σ is well-moded. ✷
Proposition 1 If H is a well-moded consistent equational presentation then
there is a convergent rewrite system O that defines the same equational con-
gruence and such that O is well-moded (when its rules are considered as equa-
tions).
Proof. We apply the unfailing completion procedure [19,22] to H to con-
struct the convergent rewrite system O. Let us prove by induction that all
generated equations l = r are well-moded. This is true at the start of the
procedure by hypothesis on H. Let us now assume that at some point a set of
well-moded equations H’ has been generated, and that there exists a critical
pair between two well-moded equations l = r and g = d. The procedure unifies
a non-variable subterm l′ of l at a position p with the non-variable term g.
Since l′ and g are non-variable, their unifiability implies that top(l′) = top(g)
and thus sig(l′) = sig(g). Since l is well-moded, the term l′ is also well-moded.
Thus the equation l′ = g is well-moded, and by Lemma 2 there exists a well-
moded mgu σ of l′ and g such that for any variable x we have sig(xσ) = sig(x).
Moreover we have sig(l′) = sig(g) = sig(d) since H’ is well-moded. Thus the
equation rσ = l[p ← dσ] added to H’ is well-moded. By induction, all equa-
tions of the obtained equation system O are well-moded. ✷
We call a subterm value of a term t a syntactic subterm of t that is either t
itself, an atom in t, or occurs at an ill-moded position in t. We denote Sub(t)
the set of subterm values of t. By extension, for a set of terms E, the set
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Sub(E) is defined as the union of the subterm values of the elements of E.
The subset of the maximal and strict subterm values of a term t plays an
important role in the sequel. We call these subterm values the factors of t,
and denote this set Factors(t). By definition this set is empty if t is itself an
atom.
Example 4 Consider two binary symbols f and g with sig(f) = sig(g) = 1
and: 

m(f, 1) = m(g, 1) = 1
m(f, 2) = m(g, 2) = 0
Consider the term t = f(f(g(a, b), f(c, c)), d). Its subterm values are a, b,
f(c, c), c, d, and its factors are a, b, f(c, c) and d.
In the rest of this paper and unless otherwise indicated, the notion of subterm
will refer to subterm values. From now on we assume that E is a well-moded
equational presentation, and thus that R is a well-moded rewrite system. Un-
der this assumption, one can prove that rewriting never overlaps subterm
values (see Lemma 4 below). We will use in the sequel a direct consequence of
the definition of subterms, which is that if s ∈ Sub(t) \ {t} then either s is an
atom or occurs at an ill-moded position in t.
The following lemma is a simple property of consistent equational theories:
Lemma 3 If H is a consistent equational theory then for any equation l = r
in a presentation of H if there exists a substitution τ such that lτ > rτ then
l is not a variable.
Proof. By contradiction assume that l is a variable and that there exists a
ground substitution τ such that lτ > rτ . By the subterm property of simpli-
fication orderings we have l /∈ Var(r). Let τ1 and τ2 be two substitutions of
support Var(r) ∪ {l} and equal to τ on Var(r) and such that lτ1 and lτ2 are
two different free constants. We have lτ1 =H rτ1 = rτ = rτ2 =H lτ2. This
contradicts the fact that H is consistent.
✷
Lemma 4 Assume that R is a set of well-moded equations, that l = r ∈ R,
and that s →R s
′ with s = s[q ← lτ ], s′ = s[q ← rτ ], and lτ > rτ . If p is
ill-moded in s and q ≤ p then there exists a position q′ in l such that a variable
occurs at position q′ in l and q · q′ ≤ p.
Proof. Since l is well-moded p cannot be equal to q · j with j position of a
function symbol in t. Hence p refers to a position in the substitution τ . ✷
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lτ
s
Fig. 2. Lemma 4 states that ill-moded positions do not occur in the dark zone since
this part is well-moded
5.2 Normalisation and replacement
5.2.1 Subterms and normalisation
We now study the evolution of the subterms of a term t when t is being nor-
malised. By considering the application of an equation in R with minimal
right-hand side and assuming the theory is well-moded, we can prove that (or-
dered) rewriting by R preserves factors in normal form. Since R is convergent,
this allows us to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Let t be a ground term with all its factors in normal form. If t′ is
minimal for < among the terms u such that t→R u then
• either sig(t) = sig(t′) and Factors(t′) ⊆ Factors(t) ∪ Cspe or
• sig(t) 6= sig(t′) and t′ ∈ Factors(t) ∪ Cspe.
Proof. Assume t→R t
′ with t′ minimal among the terms u such that t→R u.
Let l → r ∈ R be the rule applied on t at position p with substitution σ in
order to obtain t′. Since the factors are in normal form the position p is above
or incomparable to any position of a factor of t and thus all positions p′ above
p (including p) are either ǫ or well-moded.
Let q be a position of a factor s of t. By Lemma 4 either q is incomparable
with p, and thus s is also a factor of t′ at position q, or there exists a variable x
at a position p′ in l such that p ·p′ ≤ q. Since q is a minimal ill-moded position
in t, we have that s is either equal to or a factor of xσ.
By minimality of t′ and by monotonicity of < we can assume that variables of
r are either variables of l or instantiated by the constant cmin. Since Var(r)σ ⊆
Var(l)σ ∪ {cmin} and since r is well-moded, we have
• rσ is a factor of t and r is a variable,
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• or Factors(rσ) ⊆ Factors(t) ∪ Cspe.
Only two cases are possible:
1. p 6= ǫ or r is not a variable: If p 6= ǫ we have top(t) = top(t′), and thus
sig(t) = sig(t′). Otherwise if p = ǫ then r is not a variable by assumption.
Since by Lemma 3 l is not a variable either and since the equational theory
is well-moded, one has sig(l) = sig(r) and thus sig(t) = sig(t′). In both
cases one has Factors(t′) ⊆ Factors(t) ∪ Cspe and sig(t
′) = sig(t).
2. p = ǫ and r is a variable of l: Notice first that since p = ǫ we have t′ = rσ.
Since the equational theory is well-moded we have sig(r) = sig(l). Let f
be a symbol of F such that r occurs as a i-th argument of f in l. Since
l is well-moded we have m(f, i) = sig(r) = sig(l). Since p = ǫ we have
top(t) = top(l) and thus m(f, i) = sig(t). There are two sub-cases:
· If rσ is at a position of a factor of t, then rσ is ill-moded at this position,
i.e. sig(rσ) 6= m(f, i), and therefore sig(rσ) 6= sig(t) and we indeed have
t′ ∈ Factors(t) and sig(t′) 6= sig(t);
· Otherwise rσ is well-moded, and since sig(r) = sig(l) this implies that
sig(rσ) = sig(lσ) and thus sig(t′) = sig(t). One then easily sees that
Factors(t′) ⊆ Factors(t) ∪ Cspe.
✷
Lemma 6 Let t be a term with all its factors in normal form. Then either
• (t)↓ ∈ Factors(t) ∪ Cspe and sig((t)↓) 6= sig(t);
• Or sig((t)↓) = sig(t).
In both cases one has Sub((t)↓) ⊆ (Sub(t))↓ ∪ Cspe.
Proof. It suffices to apply Lemma 5 along a derivation normalising t such
that at each step a minimal successor (with respect to <) for the relation →R
is chosen. ✷
Lemma 7 For any normalised substitution σ, for any term m and for any
s ∈ Sub((mσ)↓) one of the following holds:
• s ∈ Cspe;
• There is u ∈ Sub(m) such that (uσ)↓ = s and sig(u) = sig(s);
• There exists x ∈ Var(m) such that s ∈ Sub(xσ).
Proof. Let m and s be two terms and let σ be a ground substitution such
that s ∈ Sub((mσ)↓). We have
Sub((mσ)↓) ⊆ (Sub(m)σ)↓ ∪ Sub(Var(m)σ) ∪ Cspe
Assume there exists no x ∈ Var(m) such that s ∈ Sub(xσ) and s /∈ Cspe. Let
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u ∈ Sub(m) be minimal for the subterm relation such that (uσ)↓ = s. The
above inclusion and s /∈ Sub(Var(m)σ) ∪ Cspe imply u is well-moded. If it is
a constant we have necessarily u = s and sig(u) = sig(s). Assume now u is
neither a constant or a variable and thus Factors(u) is not empty.
By minimality of u we have s /∈ ((Sub(u) \ {u})σ)↓. Thus for all v in Sub(u) \
{u} the above inclusion (replacing m by v) imply s /∈ Sub((vσ)↓). Consider
now a bottom-up normalisation of uσ stopping at factors of u and let t be the
obtained term. By Lemma 6 and s 6∈ Cspe∪Factors(t) we have sig(t) = sig(s).
By definition of t we have sig(t) = sig(u). Therefore there exists u ∈ Sub(m)
such that (uσ)↓ = s and sig(u) = sig(s). ✷
5.2.2 Replacement and normalisation
We now give conditions under which the replacement of a normal subterm s of
a term t commutes with the normalisation of t. We denote δu,v the replacement
of u by v such that if u appears at positions Πu as a subterm (i.e. as a subterm
value) of t then tδu,v = t[Πu ← v]. We denote in short δu the replacement
δu,cmin .
We define the notion of free terms.A ground term s is free in a set of terms
T with respect to a ground substitution σ if there is no t ∈ T such that
(tσ)↓ = (s)↓. A term which is not free is said to be bound by σ in T . We
will omit σ or T when they are clear from context. Since rewriting by R
never overlaps subterm values, we can prove that normalisation and subterm
replacement commute.
Lemma 8 Let t be a ground term with all its factors in normal form, and let
s be a ground term in normal form with s 6= (t)↓ and s /∈ Cspe. Then we have
(tδs)↓ = ((t)↓δs)↓.
Proof. We consider a sequence of application of rules of R that normalises
t such that, at each step a minimal successor for the relation →R is chosen.
Consider the sequence t1 = t, . . . , tn = (t)↓ of the intermediate terms. For
1 ≤ i < n the term ti is not in normal, and thus is in Factors(ti−1)∪Cspe. Thus
by Lemma 5 and for 2 ≤ i < n we have sig(ti) = sig(ti−1) and Factors(ti) ⊆
Factors(ti−1) ∪ Cspe. By iteration one thus obtains that for i < n one has
sig(ti) = sig(t) and Factors(ti) ⊆ Factors(t) ∪ Cspe, and therefore the factors
of ti are in normal form for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Thus the rule li → ri ∈ R
applied on ti is applied above (and without interfering with) the factors by
Lemma 4. On the other hand the replacement is applied below (or at the level
of) the factors of ti.
Therefore the sequence t1 →R . . .→R tn implies the equalities t1δs =E . . . =E
tnδs, and thus by transitivity of the equality, tδs =E (t)↓δs. We conclude by
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convergence of R. ✷
Example 5 Consider the equational theory E = {f(g(x)) = x}. We have:
– by definition of the mode function:


sig(f) ≥ m(f, 1)
sig(g) ≥ m(g, 1)
– since f(g(x)) is well-moded:


m(f, 1) = sig(g)
m(g, 1) = sig(x)
– since the theory is well-moded: sig(f) = sig(x)
This implies that, depending on the signature to which f belongs, we have
either
sig(f) = sig(g) = sig(x) = m(g, 1) = m(f, 1) = 0
or
sig(f) = sig(g) = sig(x) = m(g, 1) = m(f, 1) = 1
Since there is no critical pairs and the right-hand side is a subterm of the left-
hand side, the rewrite system obtained by unfailing completion is f(g(x))→ x.
Consider now the terms t = f(g(a)) and s = g(a). In both choices of the mode
function, the subterms of t are t and a, and thus tδs = t. This shows how the
notion of mode permits to define replacements compatible with normalisation.
Let s be a normalised ground term and let σ be a ground normal substitution.
Next lemma shows that under the provision that a normalised term s is free
in Sub(t) for a ground substitution σ, the replacement of s in (tσ)↓ yields the
same result as the replacement of s in σ. This will permit to transfer a pumping
argument on instantiated terms to a pumping argument on substitutions. The
proof again relies on the convergence of R.
Lemma 9 Let t be a term, σ be a normalised substitution and s be a ground
term in normal form. Assume s is free in Sub(t) for σ and let σ′ = (σδs)↓.
We have:
((tσ)↓δs)↓ = (tσ
′)↓
Proof. Since R is ground convergent it is sufficient to prove:
(tσ)↓δs =R tσ
′
For all variables x we have xσ′ =R x(σδs) by definition of σ
′, and thus:
tσ′ =R t(σδs)
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Since s is free and normalised, there is no subterm r of t, even with r variable,
such that (rσ)↓ = s, and thus such that rσ = s. Therefore we have, by
definition of δs as a replacement on subterm values:
t(σδs) =R (tσ)δs
Moreover we have (tσ)↓ =R tσ. Since σ is normalised we have Sub((tσ)↓) ⊆
(Sub(t)σ)↓ ∪ Sub(σ) and Sub(tσ) ⊆ Sub(t)σ ∪ Sub(σ). Since s is free and
normalised it is neither in Sub(t)σ nor in (Sub(t)σ)↓. Thus we have:
((tσ)↓)δs =R (tσ)δs
Hence we have (tσ)↓δs =R tσ
′ which completes the proof. ✷
Example 6 Consider now the equational theory E = {f(x, x) = 0}, the term
t = f(f(x, x), f(x, g(cmin))) and the substitution σ such that xσ = g(a), and
consider the replacement δa. Using the notations of Lemma 9, we have xσ
′ =
g(cmin), and thus tσ
′ = f(f(g(cmin), g(cmin)), f(g(cmin), g(cmin))), while on the
other hand (tσ)↓δa = f(0, f(g(cmin), g(cmin))) . This example shows that even
though s is in normal form, an extra normalisation is needed after replacement.
Replacing one of the occurrence of x by g(a) also shows why we need s to be
free in Lemma 9.
6 Well-moded intruder systems
From now on we will consider intruder systems over the signature F0 ∪ F1
modulo the equational theory E = E0 ∪ E1 as defined in Section 3.1. Let
I1 = 〈F ,S, E〉 be an intruder system where terms in S are well-moded. Such
an intruder system is called a well-moded intruder. The nice structure of well-
moded intruder will allow one to design an algorithm for intruder constraint
solving, under some hypotheses.
We can show that there is at most one alternation of signature on all well-
moded terms:
Lemma 10 Every well-moded term t can be written t = t′σ where t′ is a pure
1-term (possibly a variable) and σ a substitution that maps all variables in its
support to pure 0-terms.
Proof. Since t is well moded, below an occurrence of a F0 symbol, we can
find only F0 symbols. ✷
In the case of a well-moded intruder it is possible to split S into two sets of
well-moded terms S0 and S1 such that for all terms t in Si we have sig(t) = i
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for i ∈ {0, 1} and such that S0 contains terms built from symbols of F0. This
permits to extract from I1 a simpler intruder, namely I0 = 〈F0,S0, E0〉. In
the sequel, we will reduce some decision problems on I1 to decision problems
on I0 under some adequate hypotheses. We define E →S0 F (resp. E →S1 F ,
resp. E →S F ) if E →l→r F with l → r ∈ L
t,g for t ∈ S0 (resp. S1, resp. S).
Properties of deduction rules. Under the assumption that S is well-
moded, one can prove the following key lemmas. Lemma 12 states that when
a term appears as a new subterm of a knowledge set, it has just been built
by the intruder. Considering a derivation, this will permit to apply Lemma 14
iteratively in order to show that this term may be eliminated from the deriva-
tion. This is the main step of the proof that terms not appearing as instance
subterms of the initial constraint systems can be replaced by smaller terms
(with respect to the ordering < on ground terms) in a solution to yield a
smaller solution.
Lemma 11 Assume that E, F and s are in normal form and E → Lu,gF
using rule u ∈ S with substitution τ , and such that s /∈ (F ∪ Cspe) \ E. If
for all x ∈ Var(u) such that xτ = s we have sig(x) 6= sig(s) then (Eδs)↓ →
Lu,g(Fδs)↓
Proof. First let us assume that the rule is not a stutter (i.e. is such that
F 6= E), and thus (uτ)↓ /∈ E. Then, let us notice that if u has no variables, the
left-hand side of the deduction rule is empty, and thus the same rule can be
applied on (Eδs)↓. Since u is a pure term its atoms are constants in Cspe. Thus
s /∈ (F ∪Cspe)\E implies s /∈ Sub((u)↓), and thus (Fδs)↓ = (Eδs)↓∪{u}. The
lemma is thus valid in this specific case. Let us now review the general case.
By definition of S the term u is well-moded. The restriction on xτ permits to
ensure that all occurrences of r as a subterm in Var(u)τ are ill-moded in uτ .
The restriction s /∈ (F ∪ Cspe) \ E and the fact that the transition is not a
stutter imply (uτ)↓ 6= s. Since E is in normal form and u is well-moded the
factors of uτ are in normal form and we can apply Lemma 9, which yields the
desired result. ✷
Lemma 12 Assume E and F are in normal form. If E → IF and t ∈
Sub(F ) \ (Sub(E) ∪ Cspe), then F \ E = t and E →Lu,g F , with u ∈ S
and sig(u) = sig(t).
Proof. The hypotheses permit to apply Lemma 6. If the rule is applied
with substitution τ this implies Sub((uτ)↓) ⊆ {(uτ)↓} ∪ Sub(E) ∪Cspe. Thus
t /∈ Sub(E) ∪ Cspe implies t = (uτ)↓ and t /∈ Cspe ∪ Factors(uτ). Thus by
Lemma 6 sig(t) = sig(uτ) = sig(u). ✷
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Lemma 13 Let D : E0 → . . . → En be a derivation such that there exists
s ∈ Sub(Ei) \ (Sub(E0) ∪ Cspe). Then there exists in D a step Ej−1 →ls→s Ej
with j ≤ i and ls → s ∈ L
u,g with sig(u) = sig(s).
Proof. Consider the minimal index j such that s ∈ Sub(Ej). By hypothesis
we have j > 0 and j ≤ i. Moreover by minimality of j we have Sub(Ej) 6=
Sub(Ej−1). Since s /∈ Cspe Lemma 12 implies that Ej = Ej−1, s, and that if
Ej−1 →ls→s Ej with ls → s ∈ L
u,g then sig(u) = sig(s). ✷
Lemma 14 Assume E, s and t are in normal form, s /∈ (E ∪ Cspe), s 6= t
and cmin ∈ E. Then E, s→ E, s, t implies (Eδs)↓, s→ ((E, t)δs)↓, s.
Proof. Assume E, s →Lu,g t and let τ be the normal substitution such that
Var(u)τ ⊆ E, s and (uτ)↓ = t. We have (tδs)↓ = ((uτ)↓δs)↓ by definition of t.
Since E (and thus τ) is in normal form the factors of uτ are in normal form.
Thus by Lemma 8 we have ((uτ)δs)↓ = (tδs)↓.
The replacement δs is applied at all occurrences of s as a subterm of uτ . Since
u is well-moded and uτ 6= s, this implies that all replacements occur at or
below the level of variables of u. Given x ∈ Var(u) two cases may occur:
• If sig(x) = sig(xτ) the replacement is applied on all occurrences of s as
subterm of the factors of xτ ;
• If sig(x) 6= sig(xτ) the replacement is applied on all occurrences of s as a
subterm of xτ .
From this we can construct a substitution τ ′ such that:
• xτ ′ = s if xτ = s and sig(x) = sig(xτ);
• xτ ′ = ((xτ)δs)↓ otherwise.
This substitution yields a rule in Lu,g that, applied on (Eδs)↓, s, permits to
deduce (tδs)↓ by construction. ✷
6.1 Hypotheses on intruder systems
6.1.1 Locality hypothesis on intruder systems.
The previous lemma will be used in conjunction with an extra hypothesis that
is related to the locality property [21]. Notice that this assumption is satisfied
if the theory E1 is defined on F1 and S1 only contains pure 1-terms.
Hypothesis 1: If E →S1 E, r →S1 E, r, t and r /∈ Sub(E, t) ∪ Cspe then
there is a set of terms F such that E →∗S0 F →S1 F, t.
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Under this hypothesis when a subterm can be derived with several successive
applications of rules in S1 it can be obtained with a unique application too.
This allows one to bound the number of S1 rule applications in a derivation
with respect to the number of subterms in the constraint system we attempt
to solve.
Let us define the closure of S1 as the smallest set 〈S1〉 of terms that contains
S1 and such that if s, s
′ ∈ S1 and x is a variable of s of mode 1 then s[x ←
s′] ∈ 〈S1〉. By construction the set 〈S1〉 contains only terms with head in F1
and thus contains only well-moded terms.
Note that in Hypothesis 1 the condition r /∈ Sub(E, t) ∪ Cspe implies that
r /∈ Sub(E) and thus is of signature 1. Its ill-moded occurrences in the second
rule application can be replaced by cmin, and its well-moded occurrences can be
replaced by composing a new deduction rule in the closure 〈S1〉. Thus we can
prove that for any set of terms S1 the set of terms 〈S1〉 satisfies Hypothesis 1,
the drawback of this construction being that 〈S1〉 may be infinite.
6.1.2 Unique matching property
We consider now a unique matching property. That is, given an arbitrary
ground term t, we require that the matching of t by a term s in S1 either fails
(has no solution) or has a unique solution if the variables of signature 1 of s
are already instantiated by ground terms.
Hypothesis 2: For all terms s ∈ S1, for all substitutions τ such that
(X1 ∩ Var(s))τ ⊆ T(F) and for all ground terms t there is at most one
ground substitution σ such that sτσ =H t, and this substitution can be
computed.
In other words, a matching equation t
?
= s (with the above notations) de-
termines a partial mapping from the set of ground substitutions of support
X1 ∩ Var(s) to the set of ground substitutions of support X0 ∩ Var(s).
Notice that Hypothesis 2 is satisfied when the presentation H is a union of two
presentations on disjoint signatures as in [10,11]: In this case one can choose a
mode function such that the mode of the j-th argument of an operator in Fi
is always i. With this choice the hypothesis is always true since all variables
of a term s ∈ S1 are instantiated by the substitution τ .
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6.1.3 Reducibility of E to E0
Let us define what we mean by reduction of an equational theory to another
one.
Definition 5 (Reduction algorithm) A computable function A( ) is a reduc-
tion algorithm from an equational theory (F , E) to an equational theory (F ′, E ′)
iff for any general unification system S modulo E, the result A(S) is a finite
list of couples ((Ai, Si))1≤i≤n such that:
Sol(S) =
n⋃
i=1
Ai(Sol(Si))
where the Si are general unification systems modulo E
′, the Ai are mappings
from the set of substitutions to itself, and Sol(S ′) denotes the set of solutions
of system S ′.
When only satisfiability of unification systems modulo E is considered, we
will also call reduction algorithm a non-deterministic procedure that guesses
one of the Si. An example of reduction algorithm is basic narrowing for the
equational theory ({e, d}, {d(e(x, y), y) = x}). For solving a general unification
problem in this theory we can apply the basic narrowing procedure which
is a combination of rewriting and instanciation (see e.g. [34]). The Si are
the systems derived by the basic narrowing procedure. We can solve these
systems in the theory ({e, d}, ∅) and we get Sol(Si), for each i. The algorithm
Ai applies the substitution that has been computed in the narrowing process
to each element of Sol(Si) in order to compute an element of Sol(S).
Moreover any solution of the initial problem S can be obtained that way.
Hypothesis 3: The equational theory (F , E) is reducible to (F0, E0)
Note that in the special case where E1 does not depend on symbols in F0 we
can take for A( ) a decomposition procedure similar to the one employed for
unifiability in disjoint theories by [34,3].
A much more interesting example of reduction is given by the finite variant
property from [13]. The reduction definition that we give here is similar to
Comon-Lundh and Delaune’s one, but is slightly more general since we neither
specify how the reduction is to be done (by narrowing in their definition) nor
impose conditions on E0 (which is required to be finitary in [13]). It turns out
that, quite surprisingly, there is an example of an intruder system [7] which
is reduced to an intruder equipped with the AU equational theory and for
which ordered satisfiability of deterministic constraint systems is decidable.
We believe that covering the associativity of the concatenation operator, an
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important property in practice, is an advantage of our approach 3 .
7 Minimal solutions of constraint systems
We show now that whenever a constraint system is satisfiable it admits a
solution whose subterms can be obtained by instanciating subterms of the
given constraint system. Thanks to Hypothesis 1 this will give a bound on the
number of S1 rule applications.
Let σ be a normal ground substitution and C be a constraint system. We say
that σ is bound in C if for every s ∈ Sub(Var(C)σ) the term s is bound by
σ in Sub(C). The goal of this section is to prove that whenever a constraint
system C is satisfiable, there exists a normal ground substitution σ bound in
C such that σ |= C. The last key ingredient to this proof is the notion of quasi
well-formed derivations.
Definition 6 A derivation E0 →
∗ En and of goal t is quasi well-formed if for
every term u ∈ Sub(En) we have sig(u) = 1 implies u ∈ Sub(E0, t) ∪ Cspe.
Our goal in the rest of this section will be to prove that for all E and t either
t /∈ E or there exists a quasi well-formed derivation starting from E of goal t if
I satisfies Hypothesis 1, and to give some properties of these derivations. Let
us from now on assume this is the case for the well-moded intruder system I.
Lemma 15 Assume cmin ∈ E and E is in normal form. If t ∈ E there exists
a quasi well-formed derivation starting from E of goal t.
Proof. Given a derivation D : E →∗ F starting from E of goal t we define
ΩD = {s ∈ Sub(F ) | sig(s) = 1 and s /∈ Sub(E, t) ∪ Cspe}.
By contradiction assume there exists a term t and a set of terms E, both in
normal form, such that
min({|ΩD| |D starts from E of goal t}) > 0
Among the derivations starting from E of goal t let D be a derivation such
that |ΩD| is minimal among the derivations starting from E of goal t. Let
D : E = E0 → E1 → . . . → En = F and s ∈ ΩD. Let us contradict the
minimality of D.
3 In this case, the Ai is a function built incrementally during the narrowing process,
when one collects the unifiers applied so far.
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Claim 1 There exists an index is < n such that s = Eis \ Eis−1 and s /∈
Sub(Eis−1) and Eis−1 →Lu,g Eis with u ∈ S1.
Proof of the claim. Let is be minimal among the indices i such that s ∈
Sub(Ei). The claim is an application of Lemma 12 on this transition. ✸
We now assume s is of maximal index, i.e. that no term tj of signature 1
produced by rule in S1 with j > is is in ΩD. Moreover, for j > is one can
apply Lemma 14 to construct a derivation D′:
E0 →
∗ Eis → (Eis+1δs)↓, s→ . . .→ (Enδs)↓, s
Iterating the replacement of s by cmin if necessary, we assume that s /∈
Sub((Ejδs)↓) for j ∈ {0, . . . , n}. If we extend < as a total order on sets of
terms, one easily see (see proof of Proposition 4, for example) that this itera-
tion terminates, thus yielding sets of terms that do not contain s.
Note that s /∈ Sub(t) implies that this derivation is also of goal t. Let us prove
that we can construct a derivation also of goal t that does not contain s in the
left-hand side of any rule.
Consider the rule l → r ∈ Lu,g applied from s to (Ejδs)↓, s with a substitution
τ (that is l = Var(u)τ and r = (uτ)↓). We assume wlog that this rule is
not a stutter. Assume s ∈ l. If for all variables x instantiated by s we have
sig(x) 6= sig(s), we can replace s by cmin in uτ , and therefore in l and r by
Lemma 8. Since s /∈ Sub(r) we have a transition from (Ej−1δs)↓, s to (Ejδs)↓, s
with the rule l, cmin \s→ r in L
u,g in which s does not appear on the left-hand
side.
If there exists a variable x ∈ Var(u) such that sig(x) = sig(s) and xτ = s,
then sig(s) = 1 implies that sig(x) = 1 and, since u is well-moded, sig(u) = 1,
and therefore u ∈ S1. Since j − 1 ≥ is this implies we have the sequence:
(Ej−1δs)↓ →S1 (Ej−1δs)↓, s→S1 (Ej−1δs)↓, s, t
with s /∈ Sub((Ej−1δs)↓, t). Thus we can apply Hypothesis 1, which yields a
derivation:
(Ej−1δs)↓ →
∗
S0
F →S1 F, t
Lemma 12 implies that all terms of signature 1 in Sub(F ) are also in
Sub((Ej−1δs)↓).
By iterating along the transitions in the derivation D′ we obtain a new deriva-
tion D′′ in which s is on the left-hand side of no transition and that does not
contain more subterms of signature 1. By removing the transition creating s
in D′′ we thus obtain a derivation starting from E of goal t that contradicts
the minimality of D. Thus there exists quasi well-formed derivations starting
from E of goal t.
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✷First let us prove an auxiliary lemma that will be used to prove Proposition 2.
Lemma 16 Let D : E0 →
∗ En be a derivation without stutter, and let ti =
Ei \Ei−1. Assume that, for index j we have Ej−1 →Luj,g Ej, and sig(uj) = 1,
and sig(tj) = 0, and tj /∈ Cspe. Then tj ∈ Sub(E0).
Proof. Let i be the minimal index such that tj ∈ Sub(Ei). We have i ≤ j. By
contradiction assume i > 0. Then by Lemma 13 and t ∈ Sub(Ei) \ Sub(Ei−1)
we have Ei−1 →Lui,g Ei with Ei = Ei−1, t and sig(u) = sig(t) = 0. The latter
implies i 6= j, and therefore that the derivation contains a stutter. ✷
Lemma 16 permits to bound the number of applications of a rule in S1 in a
quasi well-formed derivation.
Proposition 2 If t ∈ E there exists a derivation D starting from E of goal t
such that the number of rules in S1 applied in D is bounded by |Sub(E, t)|.
Proof. Since t ∈ E we can consider by Lemma 15 there exists a quasi well-
formed derivation D starting from E of goal t. W.l.o.g. we assume that D is
without stutter. Let t1, . . . , tn be the terms deduced by a rule in S1 in D. Since
the derivation is without stutter n is the number of applications of rules in S1
in D. Let n0 be the number of ti of signature 0, and n1 be the number of ti of
signature 1. Since D is quasi well-formed and by Lemma 16 we have:


n0 ≤ |{t ∈ Sub(E) | sig(t) = 0}|
n1 ≤ |{t ∈ Sub(E, t) | sig(t) = 1}|
✷
Actually, not only we can bound the number of applications of rules in S1
(Proposition 2), know that the result is a subterm of E, t for a quasi well-
formed derivation starting from E of goal t, but under the same conditions we
can also bound the possible values for subterms of variables of signature 1 in
a rule of S1.
Proposition 3 Let D : E0 →Lu1,g . . . →Lun,g En be a quasi well-formed
derivation without stutter, let i be an index such that sig(ui) = 1 and let
x ∈ Var(ui) be a variable with sig(x) = 1. Then we can choose the substitu-
tion τi with which the rule is applied such that xτi ∈ Sub(E0, t).
Proof. Assume the substitution with which the i-th rule is applied is τ . Let
ti = (uτ)↓ and s = xτ .
If sig(s) = 0 then sig(s) 6= sig(x), u is well-moded and therefore s ∈
Factors(uτ). Assume first that s ∈ Sub(ti). Then by Lemma 16 and D quasi
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well-formed we have s ∈ Sub(E0, t). Assume now that s 6∈ Sub(ti). Hence
s 6= ti, and by Lemma 9:
(u((τδs)↓))↓ = ((uτ)δs)↓ = (((uτ))↓δs)↓
Choosing τi = (τδs)↓, we also have ti = (uiτi)↓, and in that case xτi ∈ Sub(E0).
If sig(xτ) = 1, we have xτ ∈ Sub(E0, t) since the derivation D is quasi well-
formed. ✷
7.1 Stability of derivations by replacement
Lemma 17 will be applied in Lemma 19 with s a free term. It shows that given
some conditions on s, derivations are stable when replacing s by cmin.
Lemma 17 Let E and F be finite sets of normalised terms with cmin ∈ E. Let
s, t be two normalised terms not in Cspe with s ∈ E \ Sub(E), and t ∈ E ∪ F .
We have:
(tδs)↓ ∈ ((E ∪ F )δs)↓
Proof. We note that s ∈ E\Sub(E) implies (Eδs)↓ = E and thus s ∈ (Eδs)↓.
By considering a derivation starting from E∪F of goal t and building s, we see
that t ∈ E,F implies, by iteration of Lemma 14, that (tδs)↓ ∈ ((E,F )δs)↓, s.
Since (Eδs)↓ = E and s ∈ E, this implies s ∈ ((E,F )δs)↓ and thus (tδs)↓ ∈
((E,F )δs)↓ ✷
7.2 Existence and properties of bound solutions
In the rest of this section we consider a constraint system C = ((Ei ✄
vi)1≤i≤n,S) and a normal ground substitution σ that satisfies C. We now prove
that there exists a bound substitution that also satisfies C. First we prove it
is possible to replace one free term s of signature in Sub(σ) by the minimal
constant cmin.
Lemma 18 Let s /∈ Cspe be a term such that s ∈ Sub((Ekσ)↓) for some
1 ≤ k ≤ n. Then either there exists i < k such that s ∈ Sub(viσ) or there exists
m ∈ Sub(Ek) such that (mσ)↓ = s and in that case either sig(s) = sig(m) or
m is a constant.
Proof. Since the constraint system is deterministic we have
Sub((Ekσ)↓) ⊆ (Sub(Ek)σ)↓ ∪ Sub(v1σ, . . . , vk−1σ) ∪ Cspe
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Assume that there is no i < k such that s ∈ Sub(viσ). Then s /∈ Cspe implies
there exists m ∈ Sub(Ek) such that (mσ)↓ = s. By s /∈ Cspe and Lemma 7
there exists u ∈ Sub(m) such that (uσ)↓ = s and sig(u) = sig(s). ✷
Lemma 19 If there exists x ∈ Var(C) and s ∈ Sub(xσ) such that s is free in
Sub(C) for σ then (σδs)↓ |= C
Proof. Let σ′ = (σδs)↓. Note that s free implies s /∈ Cspe.
First let us prove that σ′ |= S. Since s is free in Sub(C) Lemma 9 implies that
for all equations s
?
= t in S we have (sσ)↓ = (tσ)↓ implies (sσ′)↓ = (tσ′)↓.
Let us now prove that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} if there is a derivation starting
from (Eiσ)↓ of goal viσ then there is a derivation starting from (Eiσ
′)↓ of goal
viσ
′. Let j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and consider the set:
Ωs = {i | s ∈ Sub((Eiσ)↓, viσ)}
If j /∈ Ωs we have (Ejσ)↓δs = (Ejσ)↓ and vjσ = vjσδs. Since s is free Lemma 9
implies (Ejσ
′)↓ = (Ejσ)↓ and vjσ
′ = vjσ. Thus by assumption there exists a
derivation starting from (Ejσ
′)↓ of goal vjσ
′.
Thus if Ω = ∅ the Lemma is valid. Otherwise Ω 6= ∅ and we can consider the
minimum index i0 in Ω. By minimality of i0 and by Lemma 18 we have s /∈
Sub((Ei0σ)↓) and thus s ∈ Sub(vi0σ). By Lemma 12 this implies s ∈ (Ei0σ)↓.
For j ∈ Ω let Fj = (Ejσ)↓ \ (Ei0σ)↓. By (Ejσ)↓ = (Ei0σ)↓ ∪ Fj and s ∈
(Ei0σ)↓ \ Sub((Ei0σ)↓) we can apply Lemma 17 to obtain a derivation D
′
j
starting from ((Ejσ)↓δs)↓ of goal vjσ
′. Since s is free Lemma 9 implies D′j is
a derivation starting from (Ejσ
′)↓ of goal vjσ
′.
Thus for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} there is a derivation starting from (Eiσ
′)↓ of goal
viσ
′. ✷
The proof of next Proposition 4 is a direct consequence of Lemma 19 and
exploits the well-foundedness of the order < to prove it is possible to iteratively
replace all free subterms.
We can now prove that a satisfiable constraint system is satisfied by a bound
solution.
Proposition 4 Let C be a satisfiable constraint system. There exists a normal
bound substitution σ such that σ |= C.
Proof. Consider the set Σ of normal substitutions that satisfy C. By hypoth-
esis Σ is not empty. Let σ be a minimal substitution in Σ for the total ordering
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< on ground terms extended to substitutions by considering their co-domains
as finite multisets of ground terms. Let us prove σ is bound to C.
By contradiction assume there exists s free in Sub(σ) and let σ′ = σδs. By
monotony of < we have σ′ < σ. By definition of R we have (σ′)↓ ≤ σ′. By
Lemma 19 we also have (σ′)↓ |= C. Thus (σ′)↓ ∈ Σ and (σ′)↓ < σ which
contradicts the minimality of σ. ✷
In next lemma we prove that instantiating the constraint C by a bound sub-
stitution does not introduce any new subterm.
Lemma 20 Let σ be a substitution bound by itself in Sub(C). We have:
Sub((Sub(C)σ)↓) = (Sub(C)σ)↓
Proof. Let S = (Sub(C)σ)↓. The inclusion S ⊆ Sub(S) is trivial. The inclu-
sion Sub(S) ⊆ S follows directly from:
Sub((Sub(C)σ)↓) ⊆ (Sub(C)σ)↓ ∪ Sub(Var(C)σ) ∪ Cspe
Since σ is bound we have Sub(Var(C)σ) ⊆ (Sub(C)σ)↓ and by hypothesis we
have Cspe ⊆ Sub(C). ✷
8 Sufficient conditions for decidability
We now give sufficient conditions for the decidability of the various decision
problems. Given a well-moded intruder I we first treat the case of the I
deduction problem in Section 8.1. Then we give sufficient conditions for the
decidability of the I ordered satisfiability of deterministic constraint systems.
8.1 Deduction Problem
First we turn to deduction problems. Let ((Ei ✄ vi)i∈{1,...,n},S) be a ground
constraint system for a well-moded intruder I = 〈F ,S, E〉. Let also S1 =
{t ∈ S | sig(t) = 1}. Theorem 1 gives a sufficient condition for the decidability
of the I deduction problem.
Theorem 1 If:
(1) S1 is finite,
(2) 〈F0,S0, E0〉 has a decidable deduction problem;
(3) Word problems are decidable for E;
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(4) Hypotheses 1 and 2 are satisfied.
Then the I deduction problem is decidable.
Notice that since ground constraint systems are also deterministic, other suf-
ficient conditions will be given in Section 8.2. Our motivation for the intro-
duction of deduction problems was that, contrary to the case of the union
of disjoint signatures, this amounts to the reduction of ground problems to
deterministic problems, which are likely to be more difficult to solve.
Given the third condition, it is clear that it suffices to prove that ground
reachability problems are decidable. Given a set of terms E and a term t,
both ground, our algorithm decides non-deterministically t ∈ E. It consists in:
(1) guessing the number n — bounded by |Sub(E, t)| by Proposition 2 — of
rules in S1 applied in a quasi well-formed derivation — it is sufficient to
consider this case by Hypothesis 1 and Lemma 15 — starting from E and
of goal t,
(2) then guessing for each of these rules:
– the term u ∈ S1 actually employed, which is possible since S1 is finite,
– the result r of the rule (in Sub(E, t) by Lemma 16 and the definition of
quasi well-formed derivations),
– for each variable x of u with sig(x) = 1, the instance of x in Sub(E, t)
by Proposition 3
Let u′ be the term u with all its variables of signature 1 instantiated by
ground terms.
(3) For each rule u, let σ be result of the matching of t by u′ (abort if there
is no solution). Notice that σ is ground and computable by Hypothesis 2,
(4) From the above computations, if ti is the i-th term built by a S1 rule and
σi is the associated ground substitution, form the ground reachability
problems:
∧
x∈Var(u)sig(x)=0
E ∪ {t1, . . . , ti−1}✄S0 xσi
(5) Purify (which is possible because word equations are decidable) and solve
with respect to intruder I0 the obtained reachability problems.
As a side remark, we believe that this algorithm can be transformed into
a polynomial one if the ground reachability problems and if the matching
problems can be solved in polynomial time. The procedure would compute
a subset S (with t ∈ S) of terms reachable from E by checking one-step
deduction between a set of terms and a term. One-step deduction test would
be performed either by (pre-computed) rules of the form σi → ti (with ti ∈
Sub(E, t)) or tests of E ′ ✄S0 s for s subterm of the σi.
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8.2 Ordered Satisfiability Problem
We now state the main theorem of this article, which concerns the reduction
of I ordered satisfiability problems to I0 ordered satisfiability problems.
Theorem 2 We consider a well-moded intruder system 〈F ,S, E〉 such that S1
is finite, the intruder subsystem 〈F0,S0, E0〉 has a decidable ordered constraint
satisfiability problem and Hypotheses 1 and 3 are satisfied. Then the ordered
constraint satisfiability problem for 〈F ,S, E〉 is decidable.
Before giving a decision procedure for I intruder systems under the conditions
of Theorem 2, we introduce the notions of past-bound terms and of complete
prefix which permit to reduce to deterministic constraint systems.
8.2.1 Past-bound terms and complete prefixes
Let C = ((Ei ✄ vi)1≤i≤n,S) be a constraint system and σ be a solution of
C. Given t ∈ Sub(C) let us define It = {j | (tσ)↓ ∈ Sub((Sub(Ej)σ)↓, vjσ)}.
If It 6= ∅ we say that the term t is deduction-bound. In this case we define
the index of t, and denote it, the minimum index in It. If t ∈ Sub(C) is
deduction bound, we say it is past-bound if t ∈ Sub((Sub(Ejt)σ)↓) and past-
free otherwise. Finally, given a past-bound term t of index it, we say that a
term m is a complete prefix of t if:
(1) sig(m) = sig((tσ)↓) and (mσ)↓ = (tσ)↓;
(2) For all factor u of m; either (uσ)↓ is past-free or sig(u) = sig((uσ)↓)
(3) Var(m) ⊆ {v1, . . . , vit}
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to compute complete prefixes
for all past-free and constant terms t do
ϕp(t) = t
end for
while there exists deduction bound t ∈ Sub(C) with ϕp(t) undefined do
Let t ∈ Sub(C) with ϕp(t) undefined
if ϕp(·)is defined on all factors of m then
For all t′ such that (tσ)↓ = (t′σ)↓, define ϕp(t
′) as the term t where all
factors u have been replaced by ϕp(u)
end if
end while
Lemma 21 It is possible to compute a complete prefix of (tσ)↓ for all past-
bound terms t in Sub(C).
Proof. Let Ti ⊆ Sub(C) be the set of past-bound terms t of index i for which
Algorithm 1 does not compute a complete prefix. By contradiction assume
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∪ni=1Ti 6= ∅. Let i be minimal such that Ti 6= ∅, and let t be minimal in Ti for the
subterm relation. By definition of the algorithm we assume t is not a constant,
and thus t /∈ Cspe. Since t is of index i we have t /∈ Sub({v1σ, . . . , vi−1σ}).
Thus, by Lemma 7 there exists m ∈ Sub(t) such that m is a prefix of (tσ)↓.
By definition of Ti, we have t ∈ Ti and (mσ)↓ = (tσ)↓ imply that m ∈ Ti.
Thus, by minimality of t for the subterm relation in Ti, we have t = m and
thus t is a prefix of (tσ)↓. Since t is neither a variable nor a constant, the
factors of t are defined. By minimality of t in Ti, for every past-bound factor u
of t, ϕp(u) is defined and is a complete prefix of (uσ)↓. One easily checks that
ϕp(t) is then a complete prefix of t, thus contradicting t ∈ Ti, and therefore
∪ni=1Ti = ∅. ✷
Notice that Algorithm 1 only relies on the knowledge of the equivalence classes
on terms in Sub(C) induced by the solution σ and on the signature of terms.
Both can be guessed in linear time with respect to the size of the input con-
straint problem.
Lemma 22 Assume t ∈ E, and there exists a derivation from E to t such
that all rules but the last one are S0 rules. Let u ∈ S1 be the term employed
for the last deduction, and τ be the substitution applied. Then Var(u)τ ⊆ E
S0.
Proof. This follows directly from the hypotheses. ✷
Lemma 23 Let σ be a solution of a constraint system C = ((Ei✄vi)1≤i≤n,S),
and t be a deduction-bound term such that sig(t) = 0 and t is of index i. Then
if there exists a quasi well-formed derivation without stutter from (Eiσ)↓ of
goal (vσ)↓ containing a deduction E →S1 E, t then t is past-bound.
Proof. Lemma 12 and the fact that the derivation is without stutter imply
that t ∈ Sub((Eiσ)↓) and thus t ∈ Sub((Sub(Ei)σ)↓). We conclude that t is
past-bound from the fact that t is of index i. ✷
8.2.2 Algorithm
We present here a decision procedure for a well-moded intruder I that takes
as input a constraint system C = ((Ei ✄ vi)1≤i≤n,S) and a linear ordering <i
on variables and constants of C. Let m = |Sub(C)| be the number of subterms
in C.
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Algorithm 2 Combination algorithm
Step 1: Choose a m′ ≤ m and a sequence (ui)1≤i≤m′ of terms in S1, and for
each ui introduce |Var(ui)| new variables y
i
1, . . . , y
i
|Var(ui)|
. Let χi (i ∈
{0, 1}) be the subset of these variables of signature i.
Step 2: Choose an equivalence relation ≡σ among subterms of C ∪ χ1. Let
Q = {q1, . . . , qn} be a set of new variables each denoting an equivalence
class. Add to S the equation t
?
= q for each t ∈ q for each equivalence
class q ∈ Q. Let S ′ be the obtained constraint system.
Step 3: Choose a subterm relation on Q∪χ0 and a function sig : x ∈ Q∪χ0 7→
sig(q).
Step 4: Guess a subset Q1 of Q, and let L = {l1, . . . , lk} be the set Q1 ∪
{v1, . . . , vn} totally ordered by <d such that i < j implies vi <q vj and
form the constraint system C ′ = ((Fi ✄ li)1≤i≤k,S
′′) with


F1 = E1
Fi+1 = Fi ∪ (Ej+1 \ Ej) If li = vj
Fi+1 = Fi, li Otherwise
Step 5: Replace each past-bound term in C’ with a complete prefix and past-
free terms with the representative q of their equivalence class, and let C ′′
be the obtained constraint system.
Step 6: Guess a subset of m′ constraints Fi✄li in C
′′. Replace the j-th of these
constraints by |Var(uj)| constraints Fαj✄y
j
k for k ∈ {1, . . . , |Var(uj)|} and
add an equation lαj
?
= uj to S
′′;
Step 7: Reduce S ′′ to a system of general unification modulo E0.
Step 8: Solve the resulting I0 deterministic intruder system with the linear
constant restriction <i.
8.2.3 Comments on the algorithm.
We assume in the following that the ordered satisfiability problem (C, <i), with
C = ((Ei✄vi)1≤i≤n,S), is satisfied by a bound substitution σ. Letm = |Sub(C)|
be the number of subterms in C.
Step 1: By Proposition 2 For each of the derivation starting from (Eiσ)↓ of
goal (viσ)↓ there is at most m applications of a rule in S1. Actually, as we
will merge the derivations of the intruder, there will be overall at most
m′ applications of a rule in S1. Since S1 is finite, the term ui employed
in the i-th of these rules can be guessed.
Step 2: The equivalence relation can be guessed since σ is bounded. Proposi-
tion 3 permits to extend this equivalence relation over χ1.
Step 3: The choice of a subterm relation and of signature is needed to know
whether a deduction-bound term is past-free or past-bound and to com-
pute a complete prefix of it.
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Step 4: Q1 is the set of terms that are deduced by a rule of S1 that does not
end a derivation starting from (Eiσ)↓ of goal (viσ)↓. The construction of
C ′ consists in merging the derivation once the set Q1 has been guessed.
The ordering <d is the order of deduction. Notice that this construction
leads to stutters since a variable vi is also in an equivalence class. This is
however more convenient for describing succinctly the construction.
Step 5: The choices made permit to compute a complete prefix of each past-
bound term. Replacing a term by its complete prefix is preserves the
satisfaction by σ. The obtained system C ′′ will be deterministic once pu-
rified by Lemma 23.
Step 6: The replacement corresponds to the checking that the guessed rule uj
permits to construct lj. The instance of the variables of uj can be deduced
using only rules in S0 by Lemma 22.
Step 7: The reduction can be done thanks to Hypothesis 3.
Step 8: The resolution is decidable by hypothesis on I0.
From these comments, one easily sees that the algorithm is complete. It can
also easily be checked that it is correct.
8.3 Exponentiation
We present now an application of well-moded theories in the case of the ex-
ponentiation operator which is used e.g. with Diffie-Hellman scheme for the
collaborative construction of a secret key by two principals.
In order to support properties of the exponential operator in cryptographic
protocols analysis our goal is to prove the decidability of ordered satisfiability
for an intruder able to exploit the properties of exponentiations. Notice that
the specification of the exponentiation operation is dependent on the speci-
fication of the multiplication, and thus Theorem 1 of [10] cannot be applied
directly.
Notice also that simple extensions of the theory we consider here would lead
to undecidability of intruder constraints even when they are reduced to equa-
tional unification problems. See [28] for a survey of several exponentiation
theories and their unification problems. The axiomatisation we consider here
was to our knowledge first introduced in [30].
8.3.1 Intruder deduction system.
We consider the union F of the two signatures F0 = { × , i( ), 1} and F1 =
{exp( , )}. We consider terms in T(F ,X ) modulo the following equational
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theory Eexp,×:
x× (y × z) = (x× y)× z (A)
x× y = y × x (C)
x× 1 = x (U)
x× i(x) = 1 (I)
exp(x, 1) = x (E0)
exp(exp(x, y), z) = exp(x, y × z) (E1)
Let T = {x× y, i(x), 1, exp(x, y)}. We now consider the intruder system
Iexp = 〈F , T, E
exp,×〉 that represents the modular exponentiation operation
as employed for Diffie-Hellman-like construction of secret keys.
8.3.1.1 Modes. One easily checks that for the following mode and signa-
ture functions the theory Eexp,× is a well-moded theory:
• m(×, 1) = m(×, 2) = m(i, 1) = 0;
• m(exp, 1) = 1 and m(exp, 2) = 0;
• sig(×) = sig(i) = sig(1) = 0
• sig(exp) = 1
According to this definition of mode and signature we define Eexp,× to be the
union of E0 = {(A), (C), (U), (I)} and E1 = {(E0), (E1)}. The set E0 generates
the theory of a free Abelian group whose generators are the atomic symbols in
C. Meadows and Narendran have proved [30] that general unification modulo
Eexp,× can be reduced to general unification modulo E0.
Eexp,× is reducible to E0, and thus Hypothesis 3 is satisfied.
8.3.1.2 Intruder Iag. According to mode and signature functions, we can
define a sub-intruder system by taking S0 = {x× y, i(x), 1}. Let Iag be the
intruder 〈{×, i, 1}, {x× y, i(x), 1}, E0〉. Taking S1 = S \S0, it is also clear that
S1 is finite.
• S1 is finite;
• The Iag ordered constraint satisfiability problem is decidable in [11].
Lemma 24 Let E be a finite set of terms in normal form, and let r, t be two
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terms in normal form such that:
E →S1 E, r →S1 E, r, t
If r /∈ Sub(E, t) and E 6→ E, t then there exists a term u such that:
E →S0 E, u→S1 E, u, t
Proof. Assume r /∈ Sub(t) and E 6→ E, t. Since r /∈ Sub(E) it is necessary
an exponential by Lemma 12. Let σ be the substitution with which the first
rule x1, y1 → exp(x1, y1) is applied, and τ be the substitution with which the
second rule x2, y2 → exp(x2, y2) is applied. Since E 6→ E, t one must have
r = x2τ or r = y2τ , and r /∈ Sub(E) implies that r /∈ Sub(x1σ, y1σ). Let us
first assume that x2τ = r. In this case we have a derivation:
D1 : x1σ, y1σ, y2τ →S0 x1σ, y1σ, y2τ, y1σ × y2τ
→S1 x1σ, y1σ, y2τ, y1σ × y2τ, (exp(x1σ, y1σ × y2τ))↓ = t
Thus, if y2τ 6= r, we have y2τ ∈ E and therefore a derivation as re-
quested. If y2τ = r, by Lemma 11 and applying δr we also have a deduction:
x1σ, y1σ, cmin, y1σ × cmin →S1
x1σ, y1σ, cmin, y1σ × cmin, (exp(x1σ, y1σ × cmin))↓ = (tδr)↓
Since r /∈ Sub(t), this implies that if x2τ = r, there exists a sequence E →S0
E, r′ →S1 E, r
′, t. On the other hand, if x2τ 6= r, then x2τ ∈ E, and we can
directly apply Lemma 11 to find a deduction with only one rule in S1 such
that y2τ 6= r. ✷
Iexp satisfies Hypothesis 1.
It is finally shown in [30,13] that one can define a normal form for the equa-
tional theory Eexp,× such that the first argument of an exponential operator
is never itself an exponential operator. Given two ground terms t1 and t2 in
normal form, and a variable x, it is then easy to prove (by case analysis on
the top operators of t1 and t2 that the equation exp(t1, x)
?
= t2 has at most
one ground solution σ.
Iexp satisfies Hypothesis 2.
Gathering all the results given above, and applying Theorems 1 and 2, we
have the following theorem.
Theorem 3 The Iexp deduction problem and the Iexp ordered satisfiability
problem are decidable.
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Notice that the former is a consequence of the latter. Actually, the reduc-
tion result for the deduction problem is mostly useful in the case where the
ordered satisfiability problem for the underlying I0 intruder system is not de-
cidable, or its decidability is not known, but its deduction problem is. It can
be applied e.g. when reducing an intruder system to an AC intruder system
(〈{×}, {x× y}, {(A), (C)}〉), for which the deduction problem is decidable,
but the status of its ordered satisfiability problem is open.
8.3.1.3 Complexity. First let us examine the case of the deduction prob-
lem. Since satisfiability of linear equations over ZZ can be evaluated in polyno-
mial time, the deduction problem for Iag is in PTIME. The algorithm depicted
above for solving the generated matching problems is also in PTIME. Thus
we conjecture that the deduction problem for the Iexp intruder is in PTIME.
Second, and given that unification modulo Eexp,× is NP-complete [30], that
the ordered satisfiability problem for the Iag intruder is in NPTIME, that
our reduction algorithm works in NPTIME, we also conjecture that ordered
satisfiability problems for the Iexp intruder system is NP-complete.
9 Conclusion
We have introduced a combination scheme for intruder theories that extends
disjoint combination. We have shown how it can be used to derive new decid-
ability results for security protocols. The scheme relies on an extension of the
notion of locality. Unfortunately it does not apply to homomorphism proper-
ties (handled in a specific way in [24]) because they are ill-moded by nature
and more investigations are needed to see whether it can be extended in this
direction.
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